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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2770 
___________ 
 
MOHAMED DIALLO, a/k/a MAMADOU DIALLO, a/k/a MICHAEL DRAMOU, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A079-594-637) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy A. Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 24, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 14, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se petitioner Mohamed Diallo petitions for review of the order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen.  We will deny the petition in 
part and dismiss it in part. 
 Diallo is a citizen of Guinea.  He entered the United States in 1993, using a 
passport and a tourist visa in the name “Michael Dramou.”  He was ordered removed in 
absentia in 2000.  He filed a motion to reopen in 2001, which an Immigration Judge (IJ) 
denied.  Diallo appealed to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal.  Notwithstanding that 
order, in 2002 Diallo applied for derivative asylum through his then-wife, and the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Service granted the application.  Diallo thereafter 
adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident.   
 In 2012, after leaving the United States, Diallo sought reentry as a returning lawful 
permanent resident.  The Department of Homeland Security charged Diallo with being 
inadmissible as an alien who had obtained an immigration benefit by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and as an alien who did not possess a 
valid entry document, see § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).  Diallo challenged both charges, and also 
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT).   
 Diallo appeared before an IJ and testified in support of his claims.  As relevant 
here, he testified that he feared returning to Guinea both because of his Fulani ethnicity 
and his previous membership in a political group.  He stated that members of Guinea’s 
military had attacked his uncle in 1993 and his cousin in 2009.  He also presented a great 
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deal of country-conditions evidence — including reports from the United States 
Department of State and Amnesty International — detailing discrimination and human-
rights violations in Guinea.  The IJ sustained the charges of inadmissibility and denied all 
relief to Diallo, concluding that he had not testified credibly, had not corroborated his 
allegations, and had failed to meet his respective burdens of proof for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and CAT protection.1  Diallo appealed to the BIA, which 
dismissed the appeal on February 24, 2014.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s analysis in all 
relevant respects.  Diallo did not appeal the BIA’s order. 
 Nearly a year later, on February 9, 2015, Diallo filed the motion to reopen that is 
at issue here, claiming that violence against Fulani people in Guinea had increased.  In 
support of his motion, Diallo submitted a single document — Amnesty International’s 
“Annual Report: Guinea 2013.”  The BIA denied Diallo’s motion, concluding that the 
Amnesty International report had been available at the time of Diallo’s initial hearing and 
did “not show that conditions have changed in Guinea for members of the Fulani ethnic 
group.”  A.R. at 3.  The BIA also declined to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.  Diallo 
filed a petition for review to this Court.  
 Diallo’s petition for review is timely as to the BIA’s denial of his motion to 
reopen, but not the BIA’s underlying removal order.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  Thus, 
                                              
1 Further, the IJ concluded that, “even if Respondent had met his burden of establishing 
eligibility for asylum, he would be denied such relief as a matter of discretion based on 
his egregious history of making material misrepresentations to the U.S. government in 
order to obtain immigration benefits reserved for those who qualify as refugees under the 
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we have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review only the BIA’s denial of the motion 
to reopen.  See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  The BIA’s decision is entitled to 
“broad deference,” Fei Yan Zhu v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003)), and “will not be disturbed 
unless [it is] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law,” id. (alteration in 
original) (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004)).  
 In general, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final 
order of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Diallo filed 
his motion to reopen nearly a year after the BIA entered the removal order in his case.  
However, the 90-day deadline does not apply to a motion that relies on evidence of 
“changed country conditions . . . [that] is material and was not available and would not 
have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  Diallo invokes this exception.    
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diallo’s motion.  In support of his 
motion, Diallo submitted only Amnesty International’s 2013 annual report.  However, 
Diallo submitted the same document (albeit in a slightly different format) in his initial 
proceedings.  See A.R. at 783-84.  He therefore cannot show that this evidence was 
previously unavailable; nor has he shown that the conditions in Guinea have changed 
since the time of his previous IJ hearing.  See generally Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 
                                                                                                                                                  
law.”  A.R. at 129. 
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155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011).  Thus, the BIA did not err in denying Diallo’s motion.2   
Diallo also argues that the BIA abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the case 
sua sponte; however, “[b]ecause the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua 
sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to 
review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.”  
Desai v. Att’y Gen., 695 F.3d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 
320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003)).  While there are two narrow exceptions to this rule — 
a decision to deny sua sponte relief can be reviewed if it is based on an incorrect legal 
premise, see id., or if the BIA has “restricted the exercise of its discretion by establishing 
a ‘general policy’ of reopening sua sponte” under specific circumstances, Cruz v. Att’y 
Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006) — neither exception applies here.  Therefore, we 
will dismiss Diallo’s petition insofar as it challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua 
sponte. 
Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part. 
 
                                              
2 Diallo claims that the BIA failed to analyze whether he established changed country 
conditions, but, in fact, the BIA discussed this issue in detail in its opinion.  Further, the 
BIA sua sponte considered the 2014 Department of State Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices, and concluded that it did not show that the treatment of Fulani people in 
Guinea has worsened.  This represents a reasonable conclusion.  Cf. Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 
161. 
